Further, Wingstop gets a higher demand as it is located closer to the Davis In Davis sell differentiated end-products, due to the different mix of spices they The total profit under collusion (monopoly profit) is more than what they wereĬollectively making in the Cournot outcome.ģ) Fire Wings (F) and WingStop (W), the two places offering chicken-wings Produce the monopoly output and then share the monopoly profits) Show that How much would Ser Bronn and Sandor produce together if they instead couldĪgree on a collusive outcome? (The collusive outcome is where firms together He would pay a fee that would make him indifferent between If Ser Bronn can pay a fee to the corrupt “Lord Protector of the Vale” (Lordīaelish) for exclusive rights to the market, what is the largest fee he wouldīe willing to pay to prevent entry? (Hint: Start by finding the monopoly andĭuopoly profits. Each sell-sword has a marginal cost of 15. Ser Bronn would like to deter entry however, he cannot commit Operate in this market, they would have to settle for Cournot duopoly outputsĪnd profits. Warrior who recently entered the kingdom, gets enticed by the promise of wealthĪnd becomes a potential entrant in this sell-sword business. Is the only sell-sword in the kingdom of Vale currently providing such services,Īnd is thus producing the monopoly output level. Q is the total number of Trials by Combat fought by sell-swords. The demand for sellsword services in the kingdom of Vale is p = 100=Q, where p is the price when PAPERS PLEASE GAME QUESTION ABOUT IMMIGRATION TRIALSells his services to people awaiting Trial by Combat. Ser Bronn has made a reputation for himself as a gifted sell-sword who (Hint: The first mover has the ability to commit to an expansive action, forcingĢ). Why do you think this game might provide such an advantage to the first mover? Confirm that this game indeed a first-mover advantage, based on the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoffs you calculated. When everyone wants to move before the other player, we say that the game What is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium? What is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium?Īlso find the Nash Equilibria of this sequential game.ĭraw the extensive-form game tree if DC can decide first, then Marvel watches What is the Nash equilibria if both franchises make their decisions simultaneously? Are there any mixed strategy equilibria?ĭraw the extensive-form game tree if Marvel decides first, then DC watches theĭecision and makes her choice. Scared and back down), and yield to the other player. Is called “Chicken”: it’s a question of which player will “chicken out” (i.e., get The table in units of billions of dollars. National and international markets, for every choice of strategy, is presented in Marvel and DC, two competing franchises, are contemplating the number ofįormulaic superhero movies to produce every year, and for simplicity let us assume that they each can produce either 5 or 10 movies a year. PM, late assignments would not be accepted. Iii) Please submit your assignment by the deadline of March 10, 11:59 On my honor that I have not given or received any unauthorized assistance on On the coversheet, please write and sign the following honor pledge: “I pledge Ii) It is okay to discuss the course material with your peers, but please solveĪll the questions independently and write all your responses in your own words. I) When in doubt, round numeric responses to two decimal places Problem set IV (Game Theory II and Oligopoly) Please help me with my intermediate microeconomics course homework.
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